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Abstract
We develop a model where individuals all have the same probability of becoming dependent and
vote over the social long term care insurance contribution rate before buying additional private
insurance and saving. We study three types of behavioral biases, all having in common that
agents under-weight their dependency probability when taking private decisions. Sophisticated
procrastinators anticipate their mistake when voting, while optimistic and myopic agents have
preferences that are consistent across choices. Optimists under-estimate their own probability
of becoming dependent but know the average probability while myopics underestimate both.
Sophisticated procrastinators attain the rst-best allocation while myopics and optimists insure
too little and save too much. Myopics and optimists more (resp., less) biased than the median
are worse o¤ (resp., better o¤), at the majority voting equilibrium, when private insurance is
available than when it is not.
Keywords: Majority Voting, Myopia, Optimism, Sophisticated Procrastinators, Complemen-
tary Private Insurance, Dependency Linked Annuity.
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1 Introduction
Long Term Care (LTC hereafter) is the care for people needing support in many facets of living
over a prolonged period of time. Typically, this refers to help with so-called activities of daily
living, such as bathing, dressing, and getting in and out of bed(OECD, 2011). People in need
of LTC are called dependent.
LTC is an important public policy problem. According to Brown and Finkelstein (2009),
in the US, between 35 and 50 percent of 65 year old will use a nursing home at some point in
their remaining lives. Of those who use a nursing home, 10 to 20 percent will live there more
than ve years. The costs of formal LTC are also very large. Genworth (2012) surveys them
for the US: in 2012, the median annual rate for a private nursing room is more than $80,000,
while the median hourly rate charged for a home health aid is $19. The issue of the nancing of
LTC needs will loom larger in the near future because of two trends: demographic (ageing of the
population) and sociological (decrease in the amount of informal care provided by the family).
As argued by Brown and Finkelstein (2011, p122), the possibility of needing long-term care
is exactly the sort of large, uncertain expenditure risk for which insurance would seem to be
most valuable. Yet most long-term care expenditure risk is not insured in the US. A similar
statement is made for OECD countries by OECD (2011). For instance, the share of (public and
private) LTC expenditures accounted for 1.5% of GDP on average across 25 OECD countries
in 2008, while the share of formal LTC expenditures covered by private LTC insurance varies
from roughly 0.5% in France and Canada to a maximum of 5% to 7% in Japan and the United
states.1
The literature has o¤ered several explanations for the lack of LTC insurance:2 asymmetric
information problems (both moral hazard and adverse selection) induce insurers to restrict
coverage (Sloan and Norton (1997)), informal help (mainly by family members) and social
insurance crowd out the demand for private insurance (Brown and Finkelstein (2008)). Private
insurance is a­ icted by large loading factors and ine¢ ciencies (Brown and Finkelstein (2007,
2009)) while social insurance faces its own set of ine¢ ciencies plus the cost of public funds.
We focus here on a di¤erent reason for the low demand for LTC insurance: behavioral biases.
1Public LTC programs provide either cash benets or in-kind services, which depend on the needs and on the
nancial resources of the user. Since benets never totally cover the total cost of dependency, individuals have an
incentive to complement public LTC coverage with private insurance. From now on, we use the term of social
insurancefor all such public programs. They include Medicaid in the US and the APA in France.
2For surveys on long term care, see Brown and Finkelstein (2011) and Cremer et al. (2009).
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Brown and Finkelstein (2009), Pestieau and Ponthière (2010) and Zhou-Richter et al. (2010)
mention these biases as a primary reason for the lack of LTC insurance. The following quote
from OECD (2011, p.253) shows that di¤erent phenomena may be at play: For instance, the
risk associated with dependency is often deemed as too remote to warrant coverage starting
at a relatively young age. Individualsperceptions on the level of public support also a¤ect
the perceived need to hold private coverage. These may translate in individuals delaying until
an older age decisions regarding the purchase of a private LTC coverage, when they are more
likely to face high premia and less likely to pass underwriting tests (our emphasis). Biases
may then have to do with the misperception of the future level of need, or may rather resemble
procrastination, where individuals delay the decision to purchase insurance until it is too late,
or at the very least until it gets very costly.
To the best of our knowledge, there is little literature trying to disentangle these di¤erent
types of biases, and the rst objective of our paper is to clarify the meaning of these behavioral
biases by proposing di¤erent ways to model them. The second objective is then to assess the
impact of these behavioral biases on the demand for both public and private LTC insurance,
together with self-insurance (or saving).
To this end, we develop a simple two-period model where all individuals have the same income
and the same probability of becoming dependent in the second period. In the rst period, they
rst vote over an income tax rate whose proceeds are used to serve a lump-sum benet in case
of dependency. They then decide their preferred levels of saving and private LTC insurance.
The behavioral biases that a¤ect individuals translate into their putting too little weight on the
probability of becoming dependent when saving and buying LTC insurance. Agents di¤er only
according to how much they under-weight this future state of the world at this stagei.e., by
their degree of behavioral bias.
This under-weighting may come from a misperception problem, when individuals under-
estimate their own risk of becoming dependent. An extensive literature, covering di¤erent elds,
shows that some individuals exhibit a so-called Lake Wobegon e¤ect, where all or nearly all of
a group claim to be above average. (... It) has been observed among drivers, CEOs, hedge fund
managers, presidents, coaches, radio show hosts, late night comedians, stock market analysts,
college students, parents, and state education o¢ cials, among others.3 We call agents under-
3See wikipedia.org and the references mentioned there. See also the related DunningKruger e¤ect where
agents mistakenly rate their ability much higher than average.
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estimating their own risk but assessing correctly the average, economy-wide, risk the optimists
(or type O individuals).
Another type of misperception consists in under-estimating both ones own risk and the
average risk of dependency in society. We call such individuals myopic (or type M). For them,
dependency is simply seen as a smaller issue, in general, than what it is (or will be by the time
they become old enough).
The little empirical literature that studies behavioral biases in LTC decisions tend to support
this misperception problem. Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) compare the subjective probability
of entering a nursing home within ve years for respondents aged on average 78 to the actual
decisions of the same respondents after ve years. They nd that most respondents under-
estimate their true probability of needing such a form of LTC.4 Also, based on a review of
several surveys, Pauly (1990) attributes the non-purchase of private LTC insurance to the fact
that individuals lack awareness of their probability of needing LTC services. This opinion is
indirectly supported by a questionnaire conducted among nancial planners by Bacon et al.
(1989), in which the majority of respondents reported that their clients are unaware of their risk
of a potential nursing home stay. At the same time, it is unclear from these studies whether
individuals, who mostly under-estimate their own risk, also under-estimate the average risk. We
then study both myopics and optimists in the rest of the paper, and we contrast their choices. It
is worth stressing that both make the same mistake(s) when voting and when saving and buying
private insurance: their preferences are consistent (and biased) across all choices.
Alternatively, the under-weighting of the probability of being dependent may arise from a
procrastination problem: although they know perfectly their own (and the average) probability
of becoming dependent in the future, individuals delay (as in the OECD quote above) the decision
to buy LTC annuities. Observe that procrastination is much more di¢ cult at the time of voting,
since the election date is not under the control of agents. We then make the assumption that,
at the time of voting, these individuals anticipate their future procrastination problem and thus
use their true probability of becoming dependent. In other words, as in Cremer et al. (2007)
and Haavio and Kotakorpi (2011), they vote in a state of grace. We dub these individuals the
4To be fair, a non-negligeable fraction of respondents over-estimated their risk in this study. Also, compar-
ing responses on subjective survival probabilities with actual ones, Hamermesh (1985) shows that middle aged
individuals tend to under-estimate their survival probability to ages below 70 years old but over-estimate it for
ages above 70. Ludwig and Zimper (2007) obtains similar results. Since the prevalence of dependency increases
sharply with age, especially after 70, these misperceptions may lead to over-estimations of the dependency risk.
We discuss in the Conclusion how over-estimation by some agents would a¤ect our results.
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sophisticated procrastinators (or type S individuals). To the best of our knowledge, there are
no empirical results available regarding the extent of procrastination for LTC decisions.
Our main results go as follows. Both type M and O end up with too little insurance at
their most-preferred allocation, but for di¤erent reasons: myopics because they over-estimate
their consumption if dependent (since they over-estimate the LTC insurance return by under-
estimating the fraction of agents who become dependent), and optimists because they consider
insurance to be actuarially unfair (since they mistakenly consider that they constitute a better-
than-average risk). Also, very biased optimists prefer no insurance at all while very biased
myopics always buy some insurance. This di¤erence then constitutes a testable prediction of
our model, which allows to disentangle optimists from myopics. We also obtain the less intu-
itive result that types M and O save too much at their most-preferred allocation. Consistent
behavioral bias of types M and O thus not only decreases LTC insurance below socially optimal
levels, but also unbalances the mix between saving and insurance in providing for old age.
Since there is little LTC insurance bought in practice, we also investigate whether the avail-
ability or not of private insurance impacts the demand for social and self-insurance. We obtain
that it does not a¤ect the most-preferred allocation (since private and social insurance are seen
as perfect substitutes) but impacts the majority voting equilibrium. When private insurance
is available, both M and O agents vote for no social insurance, because they all prefer to buy
their most-preferred amount of insurance on the private market rather than being forced to con-
sume too much (social) insurance. When private insurance is not available, the majority chosen
amount of (social) insurance is determined by the agent with the median bias. We obtain that
making private insurance unavailable is benecial to the (M and O) individuals who are more
biased than the median (and are forced to under-insure less than they would like and induced to
reduce their over-saving), at the expense of those less biased than the median (who are forced
to insure even less than they would wish, and over-save more).
In stark contrast, type S agents make use of social insurance to obtain the socially optimal
amount of insurance. This in turn neutralizes their procrastination when choosing how much
to save. This result holds true both at their most-preferred allocation and at the majority
chosen one, and whether private insurance is available or not (since no type S buys any private
insurance). This does not t the stylized facts, as there is little (social) LTC insurance in
practice.
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We now provide a brief overview of the related literature. Our paper is linked to two emerging
strands of the political economy literature.5 The rst one consists of political economy models of
LTC. Nuscheler and Roeder (2010)s aim is to explain income redistribution and public nancing
of LTC, in a setting where voters di¤er in income and in LTC needs and where a proportional
income tax nances both a lump-sum and a LTC transfer. De Donder and Pestieau (2011)
studies the determinants of the demand for public and private LTC insurance, when individuals
di¤er in income, in risk and in access to informal care. The second strand of political economy
literature deals with agents having self-control problems. Cremer et al. (2007) models an
economy composed of both fully rational individuals and fully sophisticated procrastinators,
who also di¤er in income, and who vote over the size and the degree of income redistribution
of the pay-as-you-go pension system. Haavio and Kotakorpi (2011) compares the optimal level
of sin tax with the level chosen at the majority when individuals have di¤erent degrees of self-
control problems. As in Cremer et al. (2007), they assume that agents are sophisticated when
voting, but they allow for a continuous distribution of the degree of behavioral bias.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is then the rst to propose this distinction between
myopics and optimists and to provide a political economy analysis with both di¤erent types and
di¤erent degrees of behavioral biases.
The paper is organized as follows. We describe the model and individualspreferences in
section 2. We study the socially optimal allocation in section 3. We then solve the model by
backward induction, starting with the choice of private insurance and saving in section 4. We
study the amount of social LTC insurance chosen at equilibrium, assuming that all individuals
are either myopic (section 5), optimistic (section 6) or sophisticated procrastinators (section 7).
We discuss our results and conclude in section 8.
2 The model
We develop a two-period model with a mass one of individuals. In the rst period, agents are
young and all earn the same income w. They choose how much to save and insure for future
LTC needs. In the second period, individuals are old and face the same probability  to be
5Cremer and Roeder (2012) takes a normative perspective and examines whether misperception of individual
LTC risks and private insurance market loading costs can justify social LTC insurance and/or subsidization of
private insurance. Although they use the term of myopia, their agents are indeed optimistic since they correctly
estimate the average dependency rate in the economy. They di¤er in their degree of bias, income and dependency
risk, with the latter two positively and perfectly correlated.
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dependent and (1  ) to remain autonomous. They take no decisions when old. We assume
w.l.o.g. that the gross rate of interest is one.
Young individuals pay an income tax at a proportional rate  whose proceeds nance a social
LTC program serving a lump-sum benet b in case of dependency. The budget balance equation
of this program depends crucially on the average probability of becoming dependent (which, by
the law of large numbers, equals the proportion of elderly who become dependent). Because of
the behavioral biases (detailed at greater length later) exhibited by the agents, it is important
to distinguish the correct average dependency rate, , from the perceived one, which we denote
by . Once they have incorporated the governments budget constraint, individuals perceive
that they will receive the benet
b() =
w

; (1)
in case of dependency, while the correct level of the transfer is b().
In the rst period of their life, individuals decide how much to save and how much private
insurance to buy. We assume that private insurance is available through a LTC annuity (called
a Disability Linked Annuity, or DLA), which is a private nancial product yielding a return
di¤erentiated upon the health condition of the individual.6 The perceived return of this annuity
is Rh() in case of autonomy, with
Rh() = 1  ; (2)
and Rd(; ) in case of dependency, with
Rd(; ) = 1   + 

= 1 + 
1  

 Rh: (3)
The exogenous parameter  2 [0; 1] represents the fraction of the annuity made of insurance
while the remaining part is the fraction devoted to saving. When  = 0; we have pure saving
since the return from investing in the private annuity is independent of the LTC condition of
the agent and equals the gross interest rate of one. When  = 1; we have pure insurance since
the individual gets nothing if autonomous but believes he obtains a gross return of 1= > 1
if dependent. Raising  thus increases the return in case of dependency at the expense of the
6See Mayhew et al. (2010) and Rickayzen (2007). It is also called an enhanced life annuity (Levantesi and
Menzietti (2012)). This product is currently available in the US. We model DLAs for two reasons. First, the
instrument is interesting by itself: OECD (2011) considers that it is one of the most promising private sector
innovations, while Mayhew et al. (2010) states that DLAs could make an important contribution to LTC
planning. Second, as shown below, by varying  we can cover the case where private insurance is available
( > 0) and where it is not ( = 0).
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return when autonomous. Finally, the perceived return when dependent is decreasing in the
perceived average prevalence of dependency, , when  > 0.
Since there is little LTC insurance bought in practice, our approach allows both to sudy how
we can rationalize this lack of demand, and also to ascertain whether the availability of private
insurance does impact the demand for social and self-insurance.
An agents true (or correct) utility function is given by:
u (c) + (1  )u(dh) + v(dd()) (4)
with
8<:
c = w (1  )  a  s
dh = s+Rh()a
dd() = s+Rd(; )a+ b()
where c is rst-period consumption, dh and dd() are second-period consumptions in case of,
respectively, autonomy and dependency, s is saving and a denotes the amount of LTC annuity.
We assume that both the utility function in case of autonomy, u (:) , and in case of depen-
dency, v(:), are increasing and concave (u0 > 0, u00 < 0, v0 > 0 and v00 < 0) and that u0(0) =1.
Moreover, we assume that
v(x) = u (x  L) ;
i.e., becoming dependent is equivalent to su¤ering a monetary loss L > 0.7
As for the sequence of decisions, we assume that young individuals vote rst over the value
of the social LTC insurance contribution rate,  , that they observe the majority chosen level,
and that they then privately decide the amount of private LTC annuity that they wish to buy,
a and the amount of savings, s they want to make.8
We consider and contrast three distinct forms of behavioral biases. All have in common that
they under-estimate their probability of becoming dependent by a factor  when choosing a and
7This assumption allows us to obtain explicit formulations for the optimal allocation (section 3) and the one
most-preferred by myopic agents (section 5). Our results would hold qualitatively more generally provided that
u (x) > v (x) and u0 (x) < v0 (x) ; 8x: These assumptions reect the observations that, for any consumption level,
individuals are worse o¤ if dependent than if autonomous, but have higher needs (i.e. higher marginal utility
from consumption). The latter assumption may be disputed (see for instance Finkelstein et al., 2013) since some
goods may substitute or complement good health. Observe that if dependent people do not have higher marginal
utility than when autonomous, the lack of demand for LTC insurance is not puzzling at all.
8We assume that the transfer received by agents when old is determined by the contribution rate  implemented
when they were young. Since any change in the current contribution rate only a¤ects the future payments received
by the currently young agents, agents vote only when young. Alternatively, we could have studied an overlapping-
generation model with a pay-as-you-go LTC insurance, where variations in  impact both the (currently) young
and old agents. In that case, old agents would either be indi¤erent as to the value of  (if autonomous at the time
of voting), or favor the maximum value of  (if dependent). As for young agents, their preference would depend
on the perceived link between current contribution and future transfer. Such considerations are well known in
the political economy literature on pensions (see Sjoblom, 1985), and we abstract from them here.
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s. More precisely, they all consider their probability to become dependent as  rather than
. Agents di¤er according to this bias parameter , which is distributed in the economy on the
interval ]0; 1] with a median value denoted by med.9
Sophisticated procrastinators anticipate this mistake when voting over the social insurance
tax rate: they use the correct probability  of being dependent when voting over  , anticipating
that they will use biased probabilities  when deciding later over a and s. With this interpre-
tation, there is no reason for S individuals to mis-estimate the aggregate probability of being
dependent, so that they use  =  in their calculation of both private and public insurance
returns (see rst set of rows of Table 1).
Type Choice Weight on d state Perceived average risk 
S vote over   
choice of a /s  
O vote over   
choice of a /s  
M vote over   
choice of a /s  
Table 1: Parameters used by individuals in both decisions
Unlike sophisticated procrastinators, the other two types of behavioral biases exhibit consis-
tent preferences when voting over  and choosing a and s. The optimists anticipate correctly
the average probability of dependency  but under-estimate their own risk as  (see second set
of rows of Table 1). By contrast, myopic agents similarly under-estimate both their individual
and the average probability of becoming dependent. Since myopics under-estimate the future
prevalence of LTC for all individuals in the economy, and do not consider themselves to be
di¤erent from others, they use  as both their individual and average probability (see last set
of rows of Table 1). Type M is the only type making a mistake when anticipating the return
of both social insurance and the LTC annuity (at least as long as it embodies some insurance
characteristicsi.e., when  > 0).
Finally, we assume that society is homogenous in the sense that it consists exclusively of
agents of either type S, type M or type O. We explain in section 8 how our results would be
a¤ected if they were to coexist in the same society.
9 In the rest of the paper, we assume that no agent is totally myopic, that is to say, they all believe that they
have at least a very small chance of becoming dependent:  > 0 for all. This is a reasonable assumption that
allows to simplify our analysis since we can disregard any discontinuity in saving or voting behavior when  = 0.
In the conclusion, we discuss how our results would be a¤ected if some agents over-estimated their risk,  > 1.
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We start by identifying the socially optimal allocation that will be used as a benchmark to
assess the majority-voting equilibria studied in subsequent sections of the paper.
3 The socially optimal allocation
Whatever the type of behavioral bias, agents make a mistake when assessing how much saving
and DLA to buy. Some of them anticipate this mistake (the sophisticated procrastinators) while
others regret their past decisions once they become dependent (the myopics, whose consumption
level is lower than anticipated). Whether they realize or anticipate their mistake or not, there
is a case to be made for a paternalistic approachi.e., to evaluate the allocations using the
correct (or true) preferences of the agents, rather than the one that they mistakenly use.10 The
socially optimal allocation then corresponds to the allocation (c; dh; dd) that maximizes (4). It
corresponds to the allocation chosen by an individual without behavioral bias (i.e., with  = 1).
It is easy to show that the optimal allocation is such that marginal utilities are equalized across
states of nature:
u0 (c) = u0(dh) = v0(dd):
Equalizing marginal utilities across periods and states of the world requires two types of transfers.
To see this, we denote by S the amount of total saving (i.e., second-period transfer enjoyed
whether dependent or not) and by I the total amount of (public and private) insurance (i.e.,
transfer received only if dependent):
S  (1  )a+ s; (5)
I  w + a

: (6)
Total saving corresponds to the share 1    of the LTC annuity, plus private savings s, while
total insurance is made of both social insurance (nanced with ) and of the share  of the LTC
annuity, with the total premiumw + a sharing the same return, 1=.
The correct utility of an individual, as given by (4), can then be reformulated as
W (I; S) = u(w   S   I) + (1  )u(S) + v(S + I): (7)
10See ODonoghue and Rabin (2003) and Thaler and Sunstein (2003) for a discussion of the new paternalism
approach linked to the rise of behavioral economics. See Salanie and Treich (2009) for a paternalistic social
planner in a context where agents misperceive risks.
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Denoting the optimal values of variables by the superscript opt, we then obtain that
Sopt =
w   L
2
;
Iopt = L:
The socially optimal amount of insurance corresponds to the LTC loss, L, equalizing marginal
utilities in the two states of the world in the second period. The optimal saving amount equalizes
marginal utility across periods. In the rest of the paper, we assume that the socially optimal
allocation is feasiblei.e., that w > L.
The decentralization of (5) and (6) depends on the value of . When  = 0, DLAs are
equivalent to saving so that a and s are perfect substitutes while (6) determines a unique value of
 . When  = 1, DLAs are equivalent to private insurance so that  and a are perfect substitutes
and (5) determines a unique value of s. Finally, when 0 <  < 1, there is a continuum of values
of a, s and  that satisfy (5) and (6), since the DLA is a mix of saving and insurance.
We now turn to the study of the equilibrium with behavioral biases. We start with the
second stage choice of saving s and DLA a, and then move to the choice of the social insurance
rate  .
4 Choice of saving and DLA
The agents perceived preferences when choosing a and s are given by
U = u (w (1  )  a  s)
+ (1  )u

Rh()a+ s

+ v

b() +Rd(; )a+ s

;
with the value of  exogenous at this stage. Both public and private insurance transfers are
obtained using the return perceived by the individual, as given by (1), (2) and (3) respectively.
First-order conditions with respect to s and a are:
@U
@s
=  u0 (c) + (1  )u0

dh

+ v0

dd()

 0 (8)
@U
@a
=  u0 (c) + (1  )Rh()u0

dh

+ Rd(; )v0

dd()

 0 (9)
where dd() is the perceived future consumption of the individual in case of dependency. Intu-
itively, the individuals plan to equalize the marginal cost and benet of saving (equation (8))
and of buying DLAs (equation (9)), with the latter reecting the probability of each future state
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of the world, and the state-dependent marginal utility. Behavioral biases translate into too large
a weight being given to the autonomous state (for all types of agents), and, for myopics only,
into a mis-perception of the consumption level in case of dependency (because of over-estimation
of the public and private insurance transfers). The two FOCs di¤er in the expected return of
the two instruments.
We denote by s(; ;  ; ) and a(; ;  ; ), respectively, the agents most-preferred saving
and DLA amounts in this second stage. Applying Cramers rule on (8) and (9), we nd that
when  > 0,
ds(; ;  ; )
d
> 0 and
da(; ;  ; )
d
< 0:
There is substitution between social and private insurance, so that agents buy less DLAs when
 increases, but compensate the induced decrease in total saving by increasing s.
When  = 0, DLAs are equivalent to saving, so that the two FOCs become identical and
simplify to
u0 (c) = (1  )u0 (s) + v0 (b() + s) : (10)
We assume w.l.o.g. that a = 0 and use the implicit function theorem on (10) to obtain
ds(; 0;  ; )
d
< 0:
Unlike what happens when  > 0, there is substitutability between private savings s and social
insurance  at the equilibrium: a larger social LTC insurance program raises the marginal (rst-
period) utility cost of saving and decreases its expected marginal (second-period) utility benet,
leading to a lower level of saving.
We proceed to the choice by majority voting of the social LTC insurance level. We start by
studying the case where all individuals are myopic (section 5) before moving to the cases where
they are optimistic (section 6) and then sophisticated (section 7).
5 The myopics
The (perceived) indirect utility function of myopics (who similarly under-estimate average and
individual LTC risks) at the time of voting is given by
VM (; ; ) = u (w (1  )  sM (; ; )  aM (; ; ))
+ (1  )u(Rh()aM (; ; ) + sM (; ; ))
+v(~b+ ~RdaM (; ; ) + s

M (; ; ));
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where sM (; ; ) = s
(; ;  ; ), aM (; ; ) = a
(; ;  ; ); ~b = b() > b() and ~Rd =
Rd(; ) > Rd(; ) when  > 0.
Di¤erentiating VM with respect to  ; and making use of the envelope theorem for the optimal
choices of saving and DLA, we obtain the following FOC
@VM (; ; )
@
= w
h
v0( ~dd)  u0 (c)
i
= 0; (11)
where ~dd = dd() > dd(). The intuition for this result is that M individuals consider the
social LTC insurance as actuarially fair, since it is based on the same (mis-perceived) average
risk as the individual risk, . They use social insurance to equalize perceived marginal utilities
when young and when dependent. Observe that the only way myopia intervenes in this formula
is through ~dd: M individuals do not weight their marginal utility if dependent by , because the
under-estimation of the average risk neutralizes the under-estimation of their own risk. Observe
also that (11) holds whatever the value of .
Replacing for v0( ~dd) = u0 (c) in (8) and (9), we obtain that the most-preferred allocation of
myopic agents satises (for any  and any  > 0)
u0(c) = u0(dh) = v0( ~dd) < v0(dd): (12)
Myopics then aim at equalizing the marginal utilities in the three states of the world, but they
over-estimate their consumption level when dependent.
We now look at the combination of insurance and saving that M agents most prefer. Since
myopic agents have the same preferences when choosing  , s and a, their preferences can be
reformulated in terms of the amounts of saving, S, and insurance transfer ~I that they think they
will obtain in the second period:
u(w   S    ~I) + (1  )u(S) + v(S + ~I):
It is well known that risk averse agents fully insure themselves when o¤ered an actuarially
fair insurance contract (see Mossin (1968)) and this is what myopics think they are doing, by
setting at equilibrium
~IM 
w + a

= L: (13)
This amount does not depend on  nor on . Observe that the actual amount of insurance
payment received at the most-preferred allocation, IM , is lower than optimal, since
IM () =
w + a

= ~IM = L; (14)
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and increases with : although the targeted amount of insurance ~IM does not change with ,
agents with a larger value of  under-estimate less the insurance return and end up with a larger
insurance transfer.
The most-preferred total saving amount is given by
SM () = s+ (1  )a =
w   L
2
; (15)
so that M agents actually save too much compared to the social optimum, and that over-saving
decreases continuously to zero as agents become less myopic (i.e., as  tends toward one).
Looking back at condition (12), we see that they end up with too little consumption in the
case they become dependent: optimality would require larger payments for insurance in the rst
period, which would increase marginal utility in the rst period and thus decrease the amount
of saving purchased compared to (15).
In order to assess normatively the equilibrium allocation chosen by individuals with behav-
ioral biases, we use the correct utility function of agents (equation (7)), but measured at the
allocation chosen by the myopic individual.11 The real utility attained at his most-preferred
allocation by a myopic agent is then
W M () =W (I

M (); S

M ()):
This utility level is not a¤ected by the value of  (and whether private insurance is available
or not) but increases with , since both the choices of IM (); S

M () and the real utility level
converge to their socially optimal levels as  tends toward one.
We now move to the choice of social insurance by majority voting, and we show that the
availability of private insurance does impact the equilibrium (as opposed to most-preferred)
allocation.
When  > 0, social insurance can be complemented on the private market by buying DLAs.
Myopic agents are then indi¤erent between any values of  that give them no more social
insurance than the optimal amount of total insurance they would like to consume (as given by
(13)) i.e. between any values of  lower than (or at most equal to) ^() = L=w: Since they
can not buy negative amounts of private insurance, their perceived utility is then decreasing in
 above this threshold ^(). The unique majority-voting equilibrium (or Condorcet winning)
11For the justication of this approach, see the rst paragraph of section 3.
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value of  , denoted by VM (), is then zero, since any positive value of  , say 
, is defeated with
the support of myopic agents with ^() <  (other agents are indi¤erent and we assume that
they either abstain or throw a fair coin when deciding which tax rate to support).
By contrast, when  = 0 the only way to obtain insurance is to support a positive value of
 . We denote by M (; 0) the most-preferred tax rate of myopic individuals when  = 0, and
solving the rst-order condition (14), we obtain that
M (; 0) =
L
w
:
Since preferences over  are single-peaked (indeed, concave), there exists a unique majority
winning value of  , which is the one most-favored by the agent with the median value of ,
med:
VM (0) = 

M (med; 0) =
medL
w
:
In the rest of this section, we compare the real utility of agents at the majority voting
equilibrium according to whether private insurance is available ( > 0) or not ( = 0). We
denote by W VM (; ) this real utility level. When  > 0, we have that
W VM (; ) =W

M ();
while, when  = 0, we have12
W VM (; 0) =W (medL; s

M (; 0; 

M (med; 0))):
In words, with  > 0, we have VM () = 0 so that all agents obtain at the majority voting
equilibrium the same utility level as at their most-preferred allocation (since they are indi¤erent
between private and social insurance and thus buy their most-preferred insurance level on the
private market). With  = 0, the total insurance amount is set at the majority chosen social
insurance level IM (med) and agents then choose their most-preferred saving level.
We claim that very myopic agents are actually better o¤, at the majority voting equilibrium,
when private insurance is not availablei.e., that W VM (; 0) > W
V
M (; ) for any  > 0 and
 < med. When left to their own devices, myopics save too much and buy too little insurance.
In the absence of private insurance ( = 0), very myopic individuals ( < med) are forced
to consume more insurance than they would wish (although less than what would be socially
12We assume w.l.o.g. that aM (; 0; 

M (med; 0)) = 0, since DLAs are equivalent to saving when  = 0.
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optimal, with IM () < I

M (med) < I
opt), which induces them to reduce their over-saving,13
meaning that they move closer to the socially optimal allocation and end up better o¤ at the
majority voting equilibrium than at their most-preferred bundle (IM (); S

M ()).
By opposition, agents who are less myopic than the decisive voter ( > med) are forced to
consume even less insurance than they would wish when  = 0 (since IM () > I

M (med)),
and they react to this lower insurance level by saving more, resulting in more over-saving
and more under-insurance (compared to the optimal choice of a rational individual) than at
(IM (); S

M ()), so that W
V
M (; 0) < W
V
M (; ) for  > 0.
We summarize the main results obtained in this section in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 When agents are myopic,
(1) they save too much and insure too little at their most-preferred allocation, because they
over-estimate the returns from (private and social) insurance. Their most-preferred allocation
depends on their degree of myopia (as  increases, saving decreases while insurance increases),
but not on whether private insurance is available or not.
(2) The majority-chosen amount of social insurance is IM (med) = medL if private insurance
is unavailable and nil otherwise.
(3) Agents who are more (resp., less) myopic than the median are better o¤ (resp., worse o¤ ),
at the majority-voting equilibrium, when private insurance is unavailable ( = 0).
6 The optimists
Optimists know the correct average dependency probability in the economy ( = ) but under-
estimate their own risk both when voting and when buying DLAs. Their (perceived) indirect
utility at that stage is given by
VO (; ; ) = u (w (1  )  sO(; ; )  aO(; ; ))
+ (1  )u(Rh()aO (; ; ) + sO(; ; ))
+v(b() + sO(; ; ) +R
d(; )aO (; ; ));
where sO(; ; ) = s
(; ;  ; ) and aO(; ; ) = a
(; ;  ; ). Unlike myopics, they make
no mistake when they anticipate the returns from (social and private) insurance and their con-
13Recall from section 4 that savings and social insurance are substitutes for all agents when  = 0, so that
dsM (; 0; ) =d < 0:
15
sumption level when dependent.
Di¤erentiating VO (; ; ) with respect to  while making use of the envelope theorem for
the optimal choices of saving and DLA, we obtain the FOC
@VO (; ; )
@
= w
h
v0(dd)  u0 (c)
i
 0; (16)
for any level of . Comparing this equation with the FOC for  of the myopics (equation (11)),
we immediately see that optimists put a lower weight on the marginal utility when dependent.
It is then clear that they under-weight this state of the world not simply because they under-
estimate their own risk (a feature they share with type M agents), but rather because of the
discrepancy between what they consider to be their own risk, and the average risk determining
the LTC insurance return. In other words, it is because they consider (public and private)
LTC insurance to be actuarially unfair to them that they end up putting a lower weight on
the marginal benet of this transfer. At the same time, optimists do not over-estimate LTC
transfers, as myopics do.
After manipulations of the FOCs, we obtain the following ranking of marginal utilities (for
any  and any  > 0)
v0(dd) > u0(c) > u0(dh); (17)
meaning that optimists most-prefer too little consumption when dependent and too much if
autonomous (compared to the social optimum).
As in the previous section, it is helpful to reformulate the optimists preferences in terms of
total saving S and insurance I amounts:
u(w   S   I) + (1  )u(S) + v(S + I):
We obtain from (17) that optimists save too much (a necessary condition for dh to be too large)
at their most-preferred allocation,
SO() > S
opt;
and that they prefer too little insurance (since dd is too low),
IO() < I
opt:
The intuition for this result runs as follows: optimists want too little insurance, because their
optimism induces them both to put too low a weight on the dependency probability, and to
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consider insurance (whether public or private) as actuarially unfair to them. Buying too little
insurance decreases the marginal cost of saving while increasing its marginal benet, increasing
their most-preferred saving (which is not a¤ected by any apparent actuarial unfairness) amount
above Sopt.
Comparing with the most-preferred allocation of type M agents, we see that the main dif-
ference is that myopics equalize marginal utilities when autonomous and when young, while
optimists have a larger marginal utility when young. Both types of agents end up with too little
consumption when dependent. It is not possible to infer from these relationships a comparison
of the most-preferred saving and insurance amounts of the two types of agents.14 Indeed, we
obtain using numerical simulations15 that these comparisons can go both ways depending on
the parameters used.
Manipulations of (8), (9) and (16) show that IO () is zero below some threshold value of
, and then increasing in . In contrast to the myopics, optimists with a very large behavioral
bias (i.e., a very low value of ) prefer no insurance at all because insurance looks too unfair
to them. Denoting by O (; ) the most-preferred income tax rate of type O agents, we obtain
that, for values of  low enough that O (; ) = a

O (; ; 

O (; )) = I

O() = 0, the optimal
amount of saving sO(; ; 

O (; )) > 0 satises
u0 (w   s) = (1  )u0 (s) + v0 (s) ;
(since u0(0) =1) and is increasing in . As agents become less optimistic (i.e., as  increases),
they put more weight on the high marginal utility state of the world (dependency) and thus
save more. Observe that these results hold whether  is nil or positive, and that the threshold
value of  below which IO() = 0 is not a¤ected by  either.
Whatever the value of , application of the implicit function theorem on (8), (9) and (16)
when  is large enough that IO () > 0 shows, as for myopics, that as  increases optimists
substitute more insurance to less saving : dSO () =d < 0 and dI

O () =d > 0. As  increases,
optimists put more weight on the dependency state and consider insurance to be less actuarially
unfair. This increases their demand for total insurance, IO. On the one hand, a larger demand
for insurance increases the marginal cost of saving (since it increases the marginal utility of
rst-period consumption) while decreasing its benet (since marginal utility when dependent
14Unlike for myopics, obtaining explicit formulations for the most-preferred saving and insurance amounts of
optimists would require to specify a functional form for the utility function.
15They are available upon request to the authors.
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decreases). This in turn decreases the individuals demand for private savings. On the other
hand, the fact that a less optimistic individual puts more weight on the dependency state leads
mechanically to a larger marginal utility from saving, since v0(dd) > u0(dh). This latter e¤ect
is smaller than the former, leading less optimistic individuals to prefer less saving SO () as 
increases.
Observe then that, unlike for myopics, optimal saving is not monotone in the degree of
behavioral bias, since saving rst increases with  (when  is low enough that agents do not
want to insure themselves) and then decreases with  (when  is large enough that agents
substitute more insurance to less saving).
As for the voting equilibrium, we obtain a result similar to the case of myopic agents. When
private insurance is available ( > 0), social and private insurance are substitutes, and the
majority-chosen value of  , VO(), is zero: agents rather buy their individually most-preferred
amount of private insurance than being forced to consume too much (social) insurance. When
private insurance is not available ( = 0), the most-preferred value of  is (weakly) increasing
with , and with single-peaked (indeed concave) preferences, the majority-chosen value of  is
the one most-preferred by the agent with the median ability level: VO(0) = 

O(med; 0).
We can replicate the argument made for myopics to show that agents who are more (resp.,
less) optimistic than the median are better o¤ (resp., worse o¤), at the majority-voting equilib-
rium, when private insurance is unavailable. Formally, we denote by W VO (; ) the real utility
attained by optimists at the majority-voting equilibrium, dened as16
W VO (; ) = W

O(I

O(); S

O()) if  > 0;
W VO (; 0) = W

O(w

O(med; 0)=; s

O(; 0; 

O(med; 0))) if  = 0:
We have that W VO (; 0) > W
V
O (; ) when  > 0 for agents with  < med if 

O(med; 0) > 0,
while the opposite holds for individuals with  > med.
In a nutshell, when private insurance is available, no social insurance is publicly provided
and agents have the same utility under majority voting as at their most-preferred allocation.
When private insurance is not available, everybody is forced to consume the amount of insurance
most-preferred by the agent with the median degree of optimism. Very optimistic individuals
then benet from being forced to consume more insurance than they would wish, while being
16As for type M, we assume w.l.o.g. that aO = 0, since DLAs are equivalent to saving when  = 0.
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induced to reduce their over-saving. Individuals who are less optimistic than the median su¤er
from being obliged to consume even less insurance than the amount they most-prefer, and react
by further increasing their already too large saving amount. The only caveat is that this result
holds only if O(med; 0) > 0: if 

O(med; 0) = 0, then all individuals more optimistic than
the median also prefer no insurance and thus obtain the same utility at the majority-voting
equilibrium whatever the value of : W VO (; 0) =W

O(0; S

O()) = W
V
O (; ); 8 and   med.
We summarize the main results of this section in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 When agents are optimists,
(1) they save too much and insure too little at their most-preferred allocation, because they con-
sider (private and social) insurance to be actuarially unfair to them. Unlike myopics, very biased
optimists prefer no insurance at all. Their most-preferred allocation depends on their degree of
myopia (as  increases, saving rst increases and then decreases, while insurance weakly in-
creases), but not on whether private insurance is available or not.
(2) The majority-chosen amount of social insurance is the most-preferred amount of the individ-
ual with the median behavioral bias, med, if private insurance is unavailable and nil otherwise.
(3) Agents who are more (resp., less) myopic than the median are better o¤ (resp., worse o¤ ),
at the majority-voting equilibrium, when private insurance is unavailable.
7 The sophisticated procrastinators
In this section, we assume that, at the time agents vote, they are all sophisticated, anticipating
that their future choice of LTC annuity and of savings will be made according to their degree
of procrastination . Recall also that procrastinators know the correct average prevalence of
dependency in the economy, so that  = . Type S individuals (real and perceived) indirect
utility when voting is then
VS (; ; ) = u (w (1  )  sS (; ; )  aS (; ; ))
+ (1  )u(Rh()aS (; ; ) + sS (; ; ))
+v(b () + sS (; ; ) +R
d(; )aS (; ; ));
where sS(; ; ) = s
(; ;  ; ) and aS(; ; ) = a
(; ;  ; ):
We obtain the following proposition.
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Proposition 3 (1) 80    1, S agents unanimously most-prefer the insurance and saving
amounts that correspond to the rst-best allocation :
u0(c) = u0(dh) = v0(dd):
(2) 80    1, S agents unanimously vote for the social insurance rate that decentralizes
the rst-best allocation, and no one buys any private insurance/DLA. S agents then attain the
rst-best utility level at the majority-voting equilibrium, whether private insurance is available
or not.
Proof. See appendix.
The intuition for this proposition runs as follows. By setting the tax rate such that the social
insurance level is optimal (i.e., such that b() = L), S agents equalize their marginal utility
when autonomous and when dependent. This in turn neutralizes the impact of procrastination
on the saving choice, because it becomes immaterial that S agents under-weight their utility if
dependent when saving. Agents then have no wish to buy any private insurance. This results
into a unanimous support for the rst-best amount of social insurance coupled with no one
complementing on the private market.
8 Conclusion and extensions
Our model conrms the intuition that behavioral biases may lead to underprovision of (social
or private) LTC insurance, except for the sophisticated procrastinators. Myopics and optimists
favor too little LTC insurance, but for di¤erent reasons and with a di¤erent and testable impli-
cation: unlike myopics, very biased optimists have no demand at all for even an actuarially fair
LTC insurance (whether public or private). In our model, private insurance is available as part
of a DLA, and we obtain that the fraction of DLA that is devoted to private insurance has no
impact on how much total saving and insurance biased agents most-prefer. The availability of
private insurance is crucial for both myopics and optimists at the majority voting equilibrium, as
we show that availability of private insurance is benecial to agents less biased than the median,
but at the expense of those whore are more biased than the median.
We have seen in footnote 4 in the Introduction that the empirical evidence on behavioral
biases points to the possibility that some individuals actually over-estimate their dependency risk
(i.e., have  > 1). Although the analytical results we obtain with sophisticated procrastinators
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carry through to the case where some (or even all) exhibit  > 1, it seems to us di¢ cult
to rationalize the over-estimation of the dependency risk as some type of procrastination. This
over-estimation can still be explained as myopiaor, in this case, pessimism, and our analytical
results also carry through for these two types of agents. More precisely, type M and type O
agents with  > 1 prefer too much LTC insurance and too little saving, but as long as the
median bias is lower than one, the majority voting results are not a¤ected.
Our results can easily be extended to the case where the three types of agents coexist in
society (while keeping the continuous distribution of biases for all types). The key insight is that
individual preferences for (social or private) LTC insurance do not depend on the composition
of society. Type S individuals still prefer the socially optimal amount of social (and total)
insurance. When private insurance is available, all type O and type M agents still prefer no
social insurance at all, which remains the majority chosen equilibrium (unless type S voters
constitute a majority). When private insurance is not available, all type O and type M agents
prefer a lower-than-optimal amount of social insurance, so that the majority chosen level of
social insurance remains sub-optimal. Finally, type O and type M agents who most-prefer less
insurance than the majority-chosen level (because they are more biased than the decisive voter)
still end up being better o¤ (at the majority voting equilibrium) than if private insurance were
available, while the opposite applies to those who most-prefer more insurance.
Our framework is admittedly very simple, with agents identical in income, LTC risk and
lifetime expectancy and di¤ering only in bias type and intensity. Having di¤erent income and risk
levels would break the perfect substitutability between private and social LTC insurance, with for
instance, social insurance redistributing between income and, ex ante, risk levels while private
insurance remains actuarially fair, as in De Donder and Pestieau (2011). Also, introducing
heterogeneity in lifetime expectancies would make disability linked annuities more appealing to
certain individuals, and would allow to study the consequence of the correlation between lifetime
expectancy and dependency risk. We leave these extensions to future research.
9 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3
The preferred tax rate of a type S individual is denoted by S(; ) and, if positive, is such
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that
@VS (; ; )
@
= w
h
v0

dd

  u0 (c)
i
+
daS (; ; )
d
h
 u0 (c) + (1  )Rhu0

dh

+ Rdv0

dd
i
+
dsS (; ; )
d
h
 u0 (c) + (1  )u0

dh

+ v0

dd
i
= 0:
Assuming that the most-preferred saving amount is positive when  = S(; ), the rst-order
condition for saving (8) holds with equality and we can rewrite the above expression as
@VS (; ; )
@
=
h
v0

dd

  u0

dh
i
(1  )w +

daS (; ; )
d
+
dsS (; ; )
d

( (1  ) +  (1  ))

= 0;
so that S (; ) is such that v
0  dd = u0  dh : Plugging this equality into (8), we obtain that
v0(dd) = u0 (c) = u0(dh):
If  > 0, we then obtain that the FOC for a, (9) is negative for all a so that aS(; ; 

S(; )) = 0.
This in turn guarantees that sS(; ; 

S(; )) > 0, since we have assumed that u
0(0) ! +1.
If  = 0, a is a perfect substitute to s (equations (8) and (9) are equivalent), so that we can
assume w.l.o.g. that aS(; ; 

S(; )) = 0 which in turn guarantees that s

S(; ; 

S(; )) > 0.

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